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Sammendrag 
Ved bruk av en økonometrisk modell og paneldata for seks norske bankgrupper analyserer vi to 
spørsmål: i) hvordan endringer i finansieringskostnader slår ut i endrede utlånsrenter og ii) hvordan 
endringer i renteforskjeller mellom bankene påvirker deres markedsandeler.  Vårt datasett består av 
kvartalsdata for 2002Q1-2011Q3 og inkluderer informasjon om utlånsvolum og utlånsrenter for 
enkeltbankers lån til foretak og personer. Kostnaden ved markedsfinansiering er representert i vår 
anlayse ved 3-månders interbank renten (NIBOR) og en proxy for markedsrisiko: indikativ spread på 
usikrede 3-års norske bankobligasjoner. Våre resultater viser at 10 basispunkters økning i 3-månders 
NIBOR leder til omtrent 8 basispunkter økning i utlånsrenten. Vi finner også at etterspørselen etter 
kreditt i personmarkedet er mer elastisk mhp. lånerenten enn etterspørselen fra foretak. 
1 Introduction
In this study, we investigate two related questions: i) how changes in the funding
costs of banks a¤ect loan rates to households and businesses and ii) how changes in
relative loan rates between banks a¤ect their market shares. While the transmission
mechanism, i.e., the pass-through frommarket rates to retail rates, have been studied
extensively in both the theoretical and empirical literature,1 much less is known
about the response of credit demand to changes in loan rates. In this analysis, we
investigate both issues within a simultaneous system of equations framework. The
system encompasses a theoretical model of monopolistic competition, where banks
are price setters in the loan markets (i.e., Cournot competitors), but face a common
funding rate. According to our theoretical model, each banks market share (i.e.,
share of total loans) is a function of the ratio of its loan rate to the market loan rate,
where the latter is a price index constructed from the loan rates of the individual
banks.
Conventionally, the relationships between retail lending rates, loan volumes,
funding costs and other (macroeconomic) variables have been examined using time-
series econometric models. Typically, the focus is on aggregate demand and the
supply of credit. An example is the cointegrated vector autoregressive macroeco-
nomic model of Norges Bank (see Hammersland and Træe, 2012). However, the
problem of separating the supply and demand side e¤ects has not yet been solved
within this empirical framework. An alternative approach to resolving the identi-
cation problem is to attempt to identify exogenous liquidity shocks that a¤ect the
supply side of lending through the so-called bank-lending channel but not the
1See e.g. Allen (1988), Hannan and Berger (1991), Angbanzo (1997), De Bondt (2002), De
Graeve et al. (2007), and Banerjee et al. (2013).
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demand side. See for example Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Ashcraft (2006).2
The main novelty of this paper is to consider the determinates of retail lending
rates (the interest rate pass-through) and market shares simultaneously. From our
theoretical model of monopolistic competition between banks, we derive exclusion
restrictions, i.e., variables that a¤ect bank retail rates, but not the demand for
credit. Exclusion restrictions are essential in order to solve the classical identication
problem related to the parameters of the demand equation: retail lending rates are
determined simultaneously with loan volumes.
We restrict our attention to the microeconomic aspects of banking by analyzing
the market shares of loans of individual banks (or bank groups see below), not their
volume of loans in absolute terms. Nevertheless, we are able to estimate the elasticity
of demand with respect to loan rates, as well as investigate the impact of changes
in funding costs, including risk premiums, on retail rates. In accordance with most
empirical literature on bank interest rates (e.g., Saunders and Schumacher, 2000),
our model includes an interbank market rate; the three-month Norwegian Inter
Bank O¤ered Rate (NIBOR), as a key exogenous variable. Moreover, we measure
market risk as the indicative spread between the rate on three-year senior unsecured
bank bonds and the three-month Norwegian interbank rate. We can interpret this
particular credit spread as the compensation required by investors for both credit
and liquidity risk.
The period analyzed in this paper, from 2002Q1 to 2011Q3, includes a period of
nancial distress, with increased market risk premiums and a large fall in the policy
rate of the Norwegian central bank. When market risk (credit and/or liquidity risk)
increases, banks may restrict the loan supply at given interest rates by changing
the nonprice terms for loans and/or enforcing a stricter screening of loan applicants.
2Kashyap and Stein (1994) provide some background and discussion of the bank-lending channel.
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The Norges Banks Survey of Bank Lending3 conrms that this was indeed the case
in Norway after 2007Q4. Thus, there may be a direct e¤ect from changes in market
risk to the loan supply, especially for unsecured loans.
For our empirical analysis, we utilize quarterly panel data on Norwegian banks
which we aggregate into six bank groups. In the data, the average volumes and
interest rates over the quarter are specied for each bank group and for various types
of loans. We distinguish between loans to households and loans to corporations in
the nonnancial sector (business loans). The corresponding interest rates and loan
market shares are analyzed using a dynamic factor model. The use of common
dynamic factors is a parsimonious way of capturing comovements among variables,
as advocated e.g., by Bernanke et al. (2005) and Forni et al. (2000). As a result,
we are able to distinguish between the e¤ect on retail rates of commonly observed
variables (such as interbank market rates) and the e¤ects of unobserved common
variables (reecting, for example, changes in bank regulations, competition, and
productivity).
Our empirical framework allows us to test particular hypotheses about both
the short- and long-run steady-staterelationship between market rates (marginal
funding costs) and retail rates. We also estimate the long-run elasticity of credit
demand for households and corporations. Our results strongly suggest incomplete
pass-through of interest rates. We estimate that a 10 basis points increase in the
market rate leads to an approximately 8 basis points increase in retail loan rates.
Moreover, we nd that credit demand from households is more elastic with regard
to the loan rate than credit demand from businesses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
theoretical model of monopolistic competition between banks. Sections 3 and 4
3See http://www.norges-bank.no/en/about/published/publications/norges-banks-survey-of-
bank-lending/
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present the data and the empirical model, respectively. Section 5 discusses the
results and Section 6 concludes.
2 The theoretical framework
We take as a starting point a simple model with heterogeneous banks and derive
explicit demand functions for loans under the assumption of a representative agent
with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences over loans from di¤erent
banks. Thus, we do not derive the heterogeneity between banks from primary as-
sumptions about their location, or the distance between banks and customers, as in
the MontiKlein framework. Instead, we resort to a rather stylized representation
of product di¤erentiation. Of course, the assumption of a representative consumer
with CES preferences is standard in the industrial organization literature, since the
classical work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
First, we assume a representative agent that uses loans to nance investments
or to purchase durable consumption goods. Total loans equal
L =
NX
i=1
Li,
where Li is loans from bank i. Total interest payments equal
PN
i=1 riL, where ri is
the loan rate of bank i. We assume that L1; :::; LN enter the agents utility function,
U(), as follows:
U(C0; L1; :::; LN) = u
0@C0; NX
i=1
(aiLi)

! 1

1A ,  < 1, ai  0, (1)
where the function u() is quasiconcave and increasing in both arguments, where the
rst argument, C0, is the numeraire good and the second argument is a CES loan
quantity index. According to (1), the agents choice of total amount of loans (L)
and each banks market share, xi = Li=L, are the results of separable decisions. In
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particular, the market share xi follows from cost minimization:
fx1; :::; xNg = arg min
x1;:::;xN
NX
i=1
rixi s.t.
 
NX
i=1
(aixi)

! 1

= x.
The well-known solution is
xi = xa

i
ri
R
 
, (2)
where  = 1=(1  ) and
R =
 
NX
i=1
(ri=ai)
1 
! 1
1 
.
By allowing the parameters a1; :::; aN to take di¤erent values, the demand for
loans from di¤erent banks will di¤er, even if their loan rates are the same: r1 =
::: = rN . As we consider a representative agent, the ai-parameters cannot be given a
direct interpretation in terms of, say, transaction costs or market segmentation, but
reect the combined e¤ect of all nonprice factors that a¤ect the demand for loans
from individual banks.
For any variable zi, dene z as the geometric average of z1; :::; zN :
z =
NY
i=1
z
1
N
i : (3)
It follows from (2) that
ln(xi) =   ln(ri=r) + i, (4)
where
i = ln(x) + (ln(ai)  ln(a)).
Thus, demand depends on the relative price ri=r.
To provide loans, banks need to raise funds. We assume here that the wholesale
market is the marginal source of funding and that the banks face constant marginal
funding costs equal to c, i.e., regardless of the amount of funding. We assume
decisions regarding loans and deposits are separable, as in the MontiKlein model
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(see Freixas and Rochet, 2008, Section 3.2). Thus deposits are not considered a
marginal source of nancing. Assume furthermore that each bank has constant
operating costs equal to fi per unit of loans (i.e., costs of labor, intermediary inputs,
and physical capital). These costs may di¤er across banks and are therefore indexed
i. As in Jappelli (1993) and Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), we incorporate credit risk
through a xed bank-specic default probability, i. The banks choice of loan rate
is then given by the solution to an expected prot maximization problem:
max
ri
f(1  i)ri   c  fi)Q(ri)g , (5)
where Q(ri) = xai
 
ri
R
 
expresses the banks market share, xi, as a function of
the retail loan rate, ri. We assume that banks take both R and x as given. The
rst-order condition for solving (5) is then:
ri =

(1  i)(   1)(c+ fi): (6)
In the limiting case when  !1, the coe¢ cient of c in (6) tends to 1=(1  i).
Due to the multiplicative form of the demand function (2), the factor xai does
not enter (6). Moreover, the assumption of monopolistic competition implies that no
supply curve exists for individual banks, the banksadjustments being given solely
by the markup rule (6). For a given (endogenous) interest rate ri, the market share
is determined by (2).
If the markup coe¢ cient in (6), i.e., the coe¢ cient of c + fi, is less than one,
we have incomplete pass-through from market rates to loan rates. The more elastic
demand (the less market power), the smaller the coe¢ cient. In the (monopolis-
tic competition) model in Hannan and Berger (1991), incomplete pass-through is a
result of market power. However, as shown from (6), market power does not nec-
essarily translate into incomplete pass-through (the markup coe¢ cient being less
than one). The markup coe¢ cient will then depend on both the functional form of
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the demand function and on the degree of compensation for market risk the factor
1=(1   i). Theoretically, a more than one-to-one adjustment of retail loan rates
to changes in market rates is possible and is sometimes reported in the empirical
literature (see e.g., De Bondt, 2002; Table 1, and Banerjee et al., 2013; Table 8).
However, most empirical results support the view that pass-through is incomplete
with regard to loan rates. Thus, we will now consider some modications of our
theoretical model.
Above we assumed that the marginal source of funding for banks is wholesale
funding, regardless of their level of equity. However, during our observation period,
all banks were subject to the capital requirements of the Basel II Accords. A stylized
version of these capital requirements may be as follows (ignoring the risk weighting
of Basel II for simplicity): Assume that E=Q  , where E is total equity, Q is
total loans, and  is a lower threshold determined by regulation. If this constraint
is binding, the marginal cost of funding is a weighted sum of the marginal cost of
market funding, c, and the cost of new equity, say c. The marginal funding cost is
now (1  )c + c. If banks set marginal cost equal to marginal revenue, (6) must
be modied accordingly:
ri =
(1  )
(1  i)(   1)c+

(1  i)(   1)c+

(1  i)(   1)fi: (7)
Even if the capital requirement is not binding in a given period, the bank must take
into account the possibility that it could become so in the future. In any case, the
marginal funding cost will depend on the cost of new equity, c. A discussion of the
importance of the cost of equity for bank funding costs is given in Fabbro and Hack
(2011). Using Australian data, they nd evidence that there has been an increase
in the contribution from equity costs to the total funding costs of banks during the
last few years, especially with regard to business loans.
An important consequence of equation (7) is that the markup coe¢ cient may be
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either less than or larger than one when demand is innitely elastic. In the latter
case, the coe¢ cient becomes (1 )=(1 i). Thus, from the degree of pass-through
we cannot infer anything about the elasticity of demand.
By focusing exclusively on funding costs and by incorporating market risk through
a xed parameter, i, our formal model o¤ers an oversimplied view of the trans-
mission mechanism. Obviously, other factors may also a¤ect retail rates.
First, there is the possibility of adverse selection in that an increase in the retail
rate will attract riskier borrowers and thereby increase the risk of default (thus
i could depend on ri). In that case, banks are facing a trade-o¤: they have the
incentive to raise the lending rate as a risk premium, but are restrained by the rising
probability of default. In the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model, banks do not fully
pass all of the increase in the market rate to their retail loan rates. Instead, loan
rates are sticky upwards and credit supply rationed.
Second, other types of risk, like liquidity and interest rate risk, may also be
taken into consideration. Liquidity risk is the most important. According to the
Bank of England, during the nancial crisis a substantial part of the spread on
senior unsecured bonds was compensation for reduced liquidity in funding markets.4
Interest rate risk takes place if a bank issues a loan with a xed rate, while its
funding has a variable rate (see Freixas and Rochet, 2008). To alleviate this risk,
banks enter into interest rate swaps to achieve a level of variable rate exposure that
matches their variable rate loans.
Third, increased risk (as measured e.g., by indicative spreads) may lead to a
tightening of credit standards to better screen borrowers. Riskier projects may face
higher collateral requirements and shorter contractual maturities, or loan applica-
tions may just be turned down. While it is di¢ cult to measure (and disentangle)
4See Chapter 3 (especially Figure 3.16) in the Bank of Englands Financial Stability Report,
Issue 27, June 2010: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2010/fsrfull1006.pdf
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the di¤erent types of risk involved, and the e¤ects on retail rates and loan volumes,
the above reasoning suggests that increased risk may a¤ect both spreads (between
retail rates and the market rate) and loan volumes directly.
Given the stylized character of our theoretical model, we will not formally test
the assumptions underlying it below. We instead use it as guidance for the opera-
tionalization and interpretation of results and the choice of functional form.
3 Data
Our sample consists of the balance sheet (accounts) data of Norwegian banks from
2002Q1 until 2011Q3 as compiled by Statistics Norway.5 The bank-level data are
aggregated into seven bank groups, as listed in Table 1 (see the note to the table
for a detailed denition of the bank groups). The grouping was done according
to ownership, nationality, and common covered bond mortgage (OMF) companies.
Introduced into Norway in June 2007, OMFs have become an important source of
funding for Norwegian nancial services groups and banking alliances.6 Table 1
provides key statistics for the seven bank groups. The last group is a residual and
is not included in the econometric analysis. During the estimation period, there
have been entries, exits, mergers, and acquisitions that a¤ect the bank groups. An
example is the acquisition of Fokus bank by Danske Bank in March 2007. The
sample is constructed on the basis of the bank structure prevailing at the end of
the estimation period. For example, the time series for the DNB group includes all
banks that were included in this bank group at the end of the estimation period.
There is considerable heterogeneity in the funding sources of the banks. Small
national banks tend to have more deposits than foreign or large national banks, while
the latter tend to rely more on market funding. For example, Terra-Gruppen, which
5See http://www.ssb.no/skjema/nmark/rapport/orbof/ (in Norwegian).
6See the following article by Rakkestad and Dahl in Penger og Kredit 1/2010 (in Norwegian):
http://www.norges-bank.no/Upload/80111/OMF_marked_i_vekst_PK_1_10_nov.pdf
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is a group of small banks, had the highest average ratio (42 percent) of household
deposits over total loans during the period 20012010. In contrast, the two foreign
bank groups had the lowest ratio of household deposits to loans (18 percent) while
the largest bank group, DNB, had a ratio of 29 percent.
Figure 1 plots the logs of the market shares for each of the rst six bank groups.
Figure 2 depicts the corresponding graphs for the log of the relative loan rate of
each bank group (i.e., relative to the market loan rate index). As shown, there
is considerable persistence in both the market shares and interest rate di¤erentials
between the bank groups over time. Nonetheless, we observe some striking patterns.
For example, Bank Group 1 displays a generally declining market share for loans
to households while the opposite is the case for Bank Groups 2 and 3. Regarding
loans to businesses, Bank Group 1 appears to have lost a considerable share of its
initial market position to Bank Group 3. We also observe considerable interest rate
di¤erences between these bank groups with regard to household loans, with Bank
Group 3 generally having lower rates until 2007, but higher rates thereafter. From
Figures 1 and 2 we discern no clear connection between market shares and relative
loan rates.
Since 2001, Norwegian banks have been obliged to report their end-of-quarter
interest rates. We calculate the average interest rate of the banks in a group as the
value-weighted average of the reported interest rates. From the bank statistics, we
obtain interest rates and the volume of various loans in each bank. We weight the
interest rates by the corresponding nominal book values to obtain a value-weighted
average rate.
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The three-month e¤ective NIBOR reported by Norges Bank is a proxy for the
cost of long- and medium-term market nancing. Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of
some of the key rates. The graphs labeled Loans to householdsand Loans to busi-
nessesare geometric averages based on bank group-specic loan rates. Throughout
the observation period, the retail loan rates for businesses lie slightly above that of
loans to households.
Banks cannot raise more funds solely by increasing the rates on deposits because
bank customers (households and rms) typically do not react quickly to changes in
deposit rates. Thus, we interpret the cost of raising senior unsecured bonds from
institutional investors in the wholesale market as the marginal funding cost. An
unsecured bond may be issued with a xed or variable interest rate. In the case of
a xed rate, a Norwegian bank typically enters into an interest rate swap to achieve
a level of variable rate exposure that matches its variable rate loans. The bank
costs may be expressed by two components: the variable rate cash ows paid in the
interest rate swap (normally three-month NIBOR) and the xed cash ow due to
the issuer-specic credit spread over the swap rate.7
We include both the three-month NIBOR, henceforth denoted rt, and the spread
of unsecured senior bonds issued by Norwegian banks as measures of the cost of mar-
ket funding. As a measure of the latter, we use an index consisting of indicative bid
spreads based on average trading levels over the swap rate (three-year xed/three-
month NIBOR) for senior bonds issued by a range of Norwegian banks since 2001,
including DNB, Nordea Bank Norge, and a representative selection of banks of var-
ious sizes and ratings. Both series are shown in Figure 3.
7For examples of bank bonds with varying maturity and with inter-
est payments equal to the three-month NIBOR plus a xed credit spread,
see https://www2.sparebank1.no/portal/1001/3_privat?_nfpb=true& _pageLabel=
page_privat_innhold&aId=1201861729341
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4 The empirical model
We now formulate an empirical model that encompasses the main features of the
theoretical model presented in Section 2. As discussed, we distinguish between loans
to businesses (B) and loans to households (H). We denote the corresponding loan
rates for bank group i at time t by rBit and r
H
it , respectively, where i = 1; :::; 6, and t
refers to the end of a particular quarter in a given year. As mentioned in Section 3,
rBit and r
H
it are calculated as weighted averages of more disaggregated interest rates,
where the weights are taken from the outgoing balance in the bank accounts. The
corresponding loan market shares are denoted by xBit and x
H
it , respectively.
Retail loan rates We rst consider an econometric specication of the equations
for the retail loan rates, rBit and r
H
it . Our explanatory variables are proxies for the
exogenous funding costs of banks. The main variable is the three-month NIBOR,
rt, which is a key determinant of external funding costs. For the individual banks,
it is reasonable to assume that rt is exogenous; that is, the individual bank cannot
inuence NIBOR through its own demand for or supply of credit in the interbank
market. The rationale behind this assumption is that (major) banks can borrow
and lend Norwegian krone (NOK) through the foreign exchange rate markets; such
as the NOKUS dollar (USD) exchange swap market. Covered interest rate parity
implies that the NIBOR is determined by international lending and swap exchange
rates, which are exogenous to individual Norwegian banks.8 We also include the
credit spread, st, as an explanatory variable.
We now specify a stochastic relation between the retail loan rates (rBit ; r
H
it ) and
(rt; st). Our model accommodates exible short-term dynamics, where the di¤erent
types of retail rates and the retail rates of di¤erent banks, are allowed to react dif-
8For an example, see equation (1) in Akram and Christophersen (2011): http://www.norges-
bank.no/upload/publikasjoner/sta¤%20memo/2011/sta¤_memo_0111.pdf
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ferently to exogenous shocks. Moreover, the econometric model incorporates bank
group-specic parameters to allow for heterogeneity with regard to the bank re-
sponses to the exogenous variables. Finally, the model incorporates common shocks
to account for comovements in the di¤erent rates from unobserved (common) factors.
We model the individual retail rates as univariate autoregressive (AR) processes,
augmented with common dynamic factors. Our approach then lies in the tradition
of multivariate structural time series models.9 Specically, we assume that, for
L = B;H (businesses and households):
rLit = 
L
i + 
L
i;0rt + 
L
i;1rt 1 + 
L
i st +
piX
j=1
Lijr
L
i;t j +
mX
k=1
Likfkt + e
L
it, (8)
where Li is a bank group- and interest rate-specic xed e¤ect, the  parameters
capture the e¤ects of the NIBOR by allowing both the current NIBOR, rt (through
Li;0), and the lagged NIBOR, rt 1 (through 
L
i;1), to a¤ect r
L
it. We incorporate a
single lag to capture the e¤ect of notication rules that restrict the speed at which
banks are allowed to increase their loan rates. The credit spread measure, st, is
assumed to a¤ect bank group i through the parameters Li .
The AR parameters Lij, j = 1; :::; pi, determine how the e¤ects of a shock in
any of the exogenous variables evolve over time. The number of lags, pi, is allowed
to di¤er from bank group to bank group. The unobserved stochastic terms consist
of m dynamic factors, f1t; :::; fmt, which pick up the dependencies across banks
from common unobserved variables (e.g., the e¤ects of the business cycle, credit
market regulations, and competition). Both the number of lags, pi, and the number
of factors, m, are chosen by means of Akaikes information criterion (see below).
Finally, eLit is an idiosyncratic error term assumed to be independent across banks
(i) and over time (t).
9See Harvey (1989) for a general exposition of structural time series models and Stock and
Watson (2002) for dynamic-factor models.
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Market shares of total loans Analogously to (8), we assume that
ln(xLit) = 
L
i +
L
i;0 ln(r
L
it=r
L
t )+
L
i;1 ln(r
L
i;t 1=r
L
t 1)+
L
i st+
qiX
j=1
 Lij ln(x
L
i;t j)+
mX
k=1
Likfkt+"
L
it,
(9)
where (for sector L = H;B) the dependent variable is ln(xLit), that is, the log of bank
is market share (share of total loans in sector L) and rLt is the (market) loan rate
index to sector L. Moreover, Li is a xed e¤ect, and 
L
i;0 and 
L
i;1 capture the direct
e¤ects of the current and lagged value of ln(rLit=r
L
t ) on the dependent variable, cf.
(4). The credit spread measure, st, is allowed to a¤ect ln(xLit) through the parameters
Li . Thus, we allow for a direct e¤ect of the credit spread on loan volumes (and thus
market shares) through the nonprice terms of loans, as explained above. Note that
(9) is a dynamic equation, with qi lags of the dependent variable, ln(xLi;t j), entering
on the right-hand side of (9), with the corresponding AR parameters  Lij. Finally,
the loading coe¢ cients Lik have the same interpretation as the 
L
ik in (8).
For each bank group, the vector of dependent variables comprises (rBit ; r
H
it ; ln(x
B
it); ln(x
H
it )).
The corresponding vector of error terms (eBit ; e
H
it ; "
B
it ; "
H
it ) is assumed to be indepen-
dent across di¤erent i and t, and normally distributed with unrestricted covariance
matrix . Finally, the common dynamic factors, fkt, are assumed to be independent
Gaussian AR(1) processes:
fkt = $kfk;t 1 + kt, kt  IN (0; 1); k = 1; :::;m: (10)
The impact of the dynamic factors on an individual bank group is determined by the
bank group-specic impact coe¢ cients, Lik and 
L
ik. In our model, these factors play
a similar role to that of the risk factor contributionsof Rosen and Saunders (2010)
in the context of portfolio risk analysis. Our model is estimated using a version of
the maximum-likelihood algorithm described in Raknerud et al. (2010).
For identication, it is a crucial exclusion restriction that the NIBOR, rt, enters
(8), but not (9). This restriction is motivated by the theoretical model in Section 2.
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Another restriction is that the vector of error terms is assumed to be uncorrelated
across bank groups. The rationale for the latter assumption is that common shocks
across banks are captured by the dynamic factors. Both these restrictions contribute
to exogenous variation in the endogenous explanatory variable ln(rLit=r
L
t ) and hence
to identication.
Partial e¤ects Our econometric framework allows us to disentangle both the
short- and long-run partial e¤ects of changes in the exogenous variables on the
dependent variables. First, we are most interested in the e¤ects of the changes in
the market rate on retail lending rates. Assume that the system is in a steady state
at t dened by rt j = r and st j = s (r and s are arbitrary xed values). Then
rLit =
Li
1 Ppij=1 Lij +
 
Li;0 + 
L
i;1
1 Ppij=1 Lij
!
r +
 
L0
1 Ppij=1 Lij
!
s+ dLt (11)
is the corresponding steady-state equation. The coe¢ cients of r and s in (11) deter-
mine the long-run relation between retail rates and permanent (or persistent) levels
of the exogenous variables rt and st, whereas dLt captures the e¤ects on retail rates
of the present and lagged dynamic factors, fjs, s  t. We interpret equation (11)
as the empirical counterpart of (7), with r taking the place of the marginal funding
cost, c. Because of its lack of dynamics, it is reasonable to consider the structural
model in Section 3 as expressing the long-run (equilibrium) relations.
A similar steady-state equation with respect to the log market share ln(xLit),
given a permanent value of the retail rate rLit = r
L
i and r
L
t = r
L, is given by
ln(xLit) =
Li
1 Pqij=1  Lij +
 
Li;0 + 
L
i;0
1 Pqij=1  Lij
!
ln(rLi =r
L) +
 
L
1 Pqij=1  Lij
!
s+ Lt ,
(12)
where Lt is derived in a similar way as d
L
t . Equation (12) is the empirical counterpart
of (4). Thus, the coe¢ cient of ln(rLi =r
L) can be interpreted as the elasticity of
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substitution:  . According to the theoretical model in Section 2, this coe¢ cient
should be negative and equal across the di¤erent bank groups.
5 Results
Dynamic specications Before performing statistical tests, assessing estimation
uncertainty and interpreting results, it is important to verify whether the variables of
interest are stationary. Our maintained hypothesis is that the vector of dependent
variables, (rHit ; r
B
it ; ln(x
H
it ); ln(x
B
it)), as well as the NIBOR, rt, are I(0) processes.
These assumptions are formally tested in the Appendix and not rejected. Consistent
with this, all the estimated lag polynomials 1  Ppij=1 Lijj (L = H;B) and 1  Pqi
j=1  
L
i1
j, where  is the lag operator, have roots outside the unit circle. Moreover,
the dynamic factors, fkt, are estimated to be stationary AR(1) processes. The
number of factors, m, was set equal to four, while the number of lags in the AR(pi)
and AR(qi) equations is either two or three. We made all of these decisions by
applying Akaikes information criterion.10 An assessmen of the goodness-of-t of our
chosen model is provided in the Appendix, which reports R2 and tests for skewness,
kurtosis and serial correlation in the residuals.
Table 2 displays the estimated sum of the AR parameters
Ppi
j=1 
L
ij and
Pqi
j=1  
L
ij,
which appear, respectively, in the denominators in the long-run equations (11) and
(12), respectively. If any such sum is close to one, the corresponding retail rate,
rLit, or log market share, ln(x
L
it), is a near unit-root (integrated) process. The main
impression obtained from these estimates is that the ln(xLit) processes are highly
autocorrelated. In fact, the processes for Bank Groups 1 and 3 appear to be very
close to unit-root processes, i.e., to having
P
j  
L
ij = 1. Market shares thus adjust
slowly to changes in relative loan rates, and much more slowly than changes in retail
10See Raknerud et al. (2010) for details regarding model selection in a similar model.
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rates to changes in the NIBOR. The retail rates, on the other hand, are clearly not
unit root processes, but adjust quickly to exogenous shocks. In fact, almost all
adjustment is completed within the same and next quarter of the shock.
The Wald tests in Table 2 reveal signicant bank-specic heterogeneity in the
AR dynamics. The hypothesis that the sum of the AR coe¢ cients is equal across
bank groups is rejected at the 1 percent level for the market shares and at the 5
percent level for retail rates.
Table 2: Estimates of the sum of the AR parameters for each bank group*
.
Ppi
j=1 
L
ij
Pqi
j=1  
L
ij
Equation: H B H B
Bank Group 1 .20 (.06) .13 (.08) .94 (.14) .45 (.15)
Bank Group 2 .20 (.06) .13 (.06) .43 (.14) .45 (.14)
Bank Group 3 .13 (.06) .23 (.06) .94 (.14) .94 (.14)
Bank Group 4 .25 (.06) .11 (.14) .69 (.13) .72 (.13)
Bank Group 5 .24 (.05) .10 (.08) .53 (.14) .70 (.14)
Bank Group 6 .20 (.05) .03 (.05) .37 (.14) .77 (.14)
p-value for Wald test .04 .03 .007 .002
Standard errors in parentheses are obtained by the delta method
Wald test of the restriction that all six bank groups have
equal sum (5 d.f.)
Estimates for the retail rate equations Our focus is now on the estimated
long-run relations. Table 3 provides the estimates of the coe¢ cients of the long-
run retail rate equations (11) for each individual bank group as well as for the
representative bank, dened as the value-weighted average of the six bank groups
with weights equal to the average market share of each group (the average of the
second and third column of Table 1, respectively). For the representative bank,
the estimated coe¢ cient of r in the steady state is close to 0:8, and is signicantly
less than one for both the household and business sector. Thus, the hypothesis of
complete pass-through in the long run is clearly rejected. If we examine the bank
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group-specic estimates in Table 3, they are all remarkably close to 0:8, although
somewhat smaller for Bank Group 1 than for the other bank groups. A formal
test of whether all the steady-state coe¢ cients of r are equal across all of the bank
groups is provided by the Wald test reported in the last row of Table 3. Evidently,
we cannot reject the hypothesis of homogeneous long-run parameters. According to
our theoretical model, a small magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient for the NIBOR
indicates that loans from di¤erent banks are considered close substitutes.
We now turn to the coe¢ cients of the indicative spread, s, in the steady-state
retail rates equations. Table 3 shows that the bank group-specic parameters vary
a great deal across bank groups, and that the estimation uncertainty is considerably
larger than for the steady-state coe¢ cients of r. However, for both sectors we clearly
reject that the common coe¢ cients are equal to zero. Our estimates instead suggest
that a permanent unit increase in the credit spread leads to about a one-third
increase in the business loan rate in the long run. For households, this estimate is
somewhat lower at 0:23.
The estimates of the main coe¢ cients of the aggregate equilibrium retail rate
equations are depicted in (13):
6X
i=1
wir
H
it = dt + 0:77
(0:03)
r + 0:23
(0:06)
s
6X
i=1
wir
B
it = dt + 0:81
(0:03)
r + 0:30
(0:08
s. (13)
The estimated degree of pass-through in (13) is much smaller for the spread, s, than
for the NIBOR, r. Thus, the marginal cost of market funding cannot be written
simply as the sum of rt and st. One explanation for this nding may be that the
estimated e¤ects of variations in st are identied mainly by events immediately
before and after the onset of the nancial crisis in 2008Q3 and that it is di¢ cult
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to separate the pass-through e¤ects from the e¤ects of other events that took place
at the same time. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows that the variation in
funding costs prior to 2008 was largely determined by the NIBOR. However, from
2008Q1 to 2008Q4, the spread, st, increased dramatically, and by the end of 2011
was still much higher than its pre-2008 level. Moreover, a marked reduction in the
policy rate of the Norwegian central bank led to a sharp fall in the NIBOR. The
combined e¤ect is that from 2008Q2 we observe a distinct fall in deposit margins
relative to NIBOR (not depicted) and an (o¤setting) increase in the margins of loans
to households (relative to NIBOR). The latter e¤ect is clearly visible in Figure 3.
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Estimates of the demand elasticities The estimates of the value-weighted av-
erage elasticity of demand, the coe¢ cient of ln(rLi =r
L) in (14), show that there is
an overall negative relation between the retail loan rates and market shares in both
sectors. We conrm this using the estimates of the individual demand elasticities in
Table 4. For the representative bank, the estimates are shown in equation (14):
6X
i=1
wi ln(x
H
it ) = dt   1:44
(0:43)
ln(rHi =r
H) + 0:00
(0:15)
s
6X
i=1
wi ln(x
B
it) = dt   0:65
(0:35)
ln(rBi =r
B) + 0:05
(0:17)
s: (14)
We can see that a one percent partial increase in the loan rate to households reduces
the market share of total loans by 1.44 percent. In contrast, the demand elasticity
is estimated to be only 0.65 on average for loans to businesses. Both average
demand elasticities are signicantly di¤erent from zero at the ve percent level,
although less clearly so for business loans than household loans. In the business
sector, the estimated elasticities are even positive for some of the bank groups, albeit
statistically insignicant. It thus appears that credit demand from businesses is less
elastic than credit demand from households. This conclusion should, however, be
interpreted with some care. As discussed in Section 2, banks may raise their lending
standards when they face higher funding costs. Moreover, Maddaloni and Peydró
(2011) nd that banks raise their lending standards more to households than to
businesses. Thus, some of the estimated di¤erence in elasticity could be a (supply-
side) e¤ect of tighter lending standards.
We do not nd a signicant negative e¤ect of the risk measure s. This is not
surprising, as higher risk is more likely to a¤ect the aggregate supply of credit than
the market shares of individual banks, which necessarily sum to one over all bank
groups (when we include the residual bank group).
25
T
ab
le
4:
E
st
im
at
es
of
th
e
ke
y
p
ar
am
et
er
s
in
th
e
st
ea
d
y-
st
at
e
eq
u
at
io
n
s
fo
r
m
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
es
.
C
oe
¢
ci
en
ts
of
ln
(r
L i
=r
L
)
C
oe
¢
ci
en
ts
of
s
E
qu
at
io
n:
H
B
H
B
B
an
k
G
ro
up
1
 1
:5
4
(:
34
)
 1
:1
9
(:
59
)
:0
3
(:
17
)
 :
11
(:
24
)
B
an
k
G
ro
up
2
 1
:0
3
(:
42
)
:5
0
(:
47
)
:3
2
(:
14
)
 :
12
(:
21
)
B
an
k
G
ro
up
3
 :
49
(:
48
)
 1
:5
0
(:
54
)
 :
34
(:
06
)
 :
34
(:
21
)
B
an
k
G
ro
up
4
 2
:2
6
(:
40
)
 :
76
(:
38
)
 :
17
(:
12
)
:2
7
(:
15
)
B
an
k
G
ro
up
5
 1
:0
9
(:
41
)
:3
0
(:
28
)
:0
7
(:
14
)
:4
7
(:
16
)
B
an
k
G
ro
up
6
 1
:4
8
(:
40
)
:2
2
(:
25
)
:4
0
(:
19
)
:6
0
(:
18
)
C
om
m
on
es
ti
m
at
e
 1
:4
4
(:
43
)
 :
65
(:
35
)
:0
0
(:
15
)
:0
5
(:
17
)
p-
va
lu
e
of
W
al
d
te
st

:0
7
:1
2
:0
1
:0
2
 V
al
ue
-w
ei
gh
te
d
av
er
ag
e
of
th
e
si
x
ba
nk
gr
ou
p-
sp
ec
i
c
co
e¢
ci
en
ts

W
al
d
te
st
of
th
e
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
th
at
al
l
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
ar
e
eq
ua
l
(5
d.
f.)
26
6 Conclusion
We have used a dynamic factor model and a detailed panel data set with quarterly
accounts data for all Norwegian banks to examine how the funding costs of banks
a¤ect their interest rates and how changes in an individual bank groups loan rate
relative to the market loan rate a¤ect its market share. In our analysis, we proxied
the cost of market funding using the three-month NIBOR. We nd clear evidence
of incomplete pass-through from the NIBOR to retail loan rates, with loan rates
increasing less than the NIBOR. Our estimates show that a 10 basis point increase
in NIBOR leads to an approximately 8 point increase in bank loan rates in the long
run. We also nd a signicant positive relation between the indicative credit spread
of uncovered bonds issued by banks and loan rates. The degree of pass-through from
the credit spread rate to the loan rates is estimated to be much smaller than for the
NIBOR. The explanation for this may be that the latter pass-through e¤ect is poorly
identied. The credit spread was very low and almost constant until the onset of
the nancial crisis. It is therefore di¢ cult to separate the e¤ects of increased credit
spread from the e¤ects of policy measures that were simultaneously implemented to
reduce bank funding costs, e.g., the introduction of covered bonds, which allowed
banks to fund mortgage loans more cheaply.
Finally, we estimate a signicantly negative credit demand elasticity with respect
to loan rates for both households and businesses. On average, a (permanent) one
percent increase in a banks loan rate to households (for a given level of the market
loan rate index) reduces its market share by 1.44 percent in the long run. We
estimated the corresponding demand elasticity to be 0.65 for loans to businesses.
This di¤erence could indicate a higher degree of market segmentation in the business
27
loan sector. However, this nding should be interpreted with some care as banks may
raise their lending standards when they face higher funding costs and this e¤ect may
be stronger for households than for businesses. Thus, some of the higher estimated
elasticity for household loans could reect the (supply-side) e¤ects of changes in
lending standards.
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Appendix: Test of stationarity and goodness-of-t
Stationarity of the dependent and exogenous variables The hypothesis that
rt is not a unit root process was considered in Raknerud et al. (2011), using both
daily and quarterly data, applying the test proposed by Choi (1994). The null
hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative that rt is a unit root process was not
rejected. This result is consistent with Choi and Ahn (1999), who did not reject that
the real interest rate is stationary using monthly data for several countries over the
period 19801991 (Norway not included). On the other hand, using an augmented
DickeyFuller test on quarterly NOK real interest rate data for the period 1986
2008, Anundsen and Jansen (2011) nd evidence that both the nominal interest
rate and the ination rate are I(1), but that the real interest rate is I(0). Although
we use nominal interest rates, not real interest rates, our data are from a period
with ination targeting and a low and stable ination rate.
Next, we tested the joint stationarity of the dependent variables against the al-
ternative that any of these time series are unit root processes (possibly cointegrated).
To do this, we applied the multivariate test proposed by Choi and Ahn (1999) on
the vector (rHit ; r
B
it ; ln(x
H
it ); ln(x
B
it)) for each of the 6 bank groups. We used their pro-
posed LMI test statistic. The value of LMI varied from 0.37 to 1.96 in our sample.
Given the number of time series in each vector is four (n = 4) the value of the test
statistic is below any of the critical values reported in Choi and Ahn (1999).11 For
example, the 90% percentile of LMI , with n = 4, is 2.52 (see their Table 1b).
Goodness-of-t To assess the goodness-of-t of our model we now report some
diagnostic tests. Table 5 provides the test statistics for skewness and kurtosis, while
the results of the portmanteau tests for serial correlation (based on the Q statistic)
11We used the automatic lag truncation procedure proposed by Andrews (1991), which led to
10  #lags  14.
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Table 5: Test statistics for skewness and kurtosis
Test statistic for skewness (S) Test statistic for kurtosis (K)
Bank Group rHit r
B
it ln(x
H
it ) ln(x
B
it) r
H
it r
B
it ln(x
H
it ) ln(x
B
it)
1 :50 :80 :46  :01 1:71 :36 :45 1:51
2 :20 :58 :24  :47 :28 :34 :79  :29
3 :59 :88 2:15 :78 :29 1:34 :80 :16
4 2:96 1:77 1:65 :60 1:98 5:24 :32  :07
5 :88  :03 :27 :01 :04 :23  :64  :90
6 :36 1:98  2:64 :89 :23 :04 2:61  :66
Table 6: R-squared and Portmanteau (Q) test statistic for serial correla-
tion in the innovations
rHit r
B
it ln(x
H
it ) ln(x
B
it)
R2 :981 :989 :986 :977
Q 321 296 341 322
sd2 360 360 360 360
n 65 65 62 62
d:f: 295 295 298 298
p-value :14 :47 :03 :16
Note: s, d and nare dened in fn. 11
are shown in Table 6. When all parameters are known, the asymptotic distribution
of Q is known to be 2 with d2s degrees of freedom, where d is the number of
equations and s is the number of lags used in the calculation of Q (see Reinsel, 1993).
To use these tests in our context, certain adjustments to the standard procedures
are necessary.12
The R2 reported in the rst row in Table 6 is dened as 1 tr(RSS)/tr(TSS),
where RSS is the matrix of the sum of squares of the (one-step-ahead) predic-
tion errors, TSS is the matrix of the total sum of squares and tr() denotes the
trace. The results in Table 5 show that only rHit in Bank Group 4 is problematic
for the assumption of normality, while the results in Table 6 indicate that the vec-
12The degrees of freedom must be adjusted for dependence among residuals caused by the re-
placement of the true parameters by the estimated parameters. It is known in some special cases
that Q  2(d2s   n), where n is the number of estimated parameters, except the parameters
of . This result holds in the case of the homogeneous SUTSE model discussed in Harvey (1989),
and also in the VARMA(p; q) models, where n = d2(p+q). The degrees of freedom (d.f.) in Table
6 are based on the conjecture that this result is also valid in our case (with s = 10 chosen using
the automatic lag truncation procedure mentioned in Footnote 11.
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tor (ln(xH1t); :::; ln(x
H
6t)) may violate the assumption of no serial correlation in the
innovations. However, the rejection is not clear, the lowest p-value in Table 6 being
0.03.
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Figure 1: Logarithm of loan market shares for six bank groups: Loans to households
and businesses.
36
Figure 2: Logarithm of lending rate for each bank group relative to the (market)
loan rate index.
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Figure 3: Three month NIBOR rates, market interest rate index for loans to rms
and households, and indicative credit spread on senior unsecured bank bonds.
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